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From Observer to Player: Evaluating Africa’s Preparedness for Effective

G20 Participation

De observador a participante: Evaluación de la preparación de África para

una participación efectiva en el G20

Samir Bhattacharya

Jawaharlal Nehru University

Orcid ID- https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4188-9104

Samir.b@orfonline.org

Dr Samir Bhattacharya did his PhD from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. He is currently

Associate Fellow at Observer Research Foundation..

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Abstract

A frica is at a historic crossroads, poised to influence international discussions and policies as

it has joined the G20 as a permanent member in 2024. Given the opportunity to voice its opinion

on critical global issues, Africa’s anticipation is naturally high. However, there are doubts about

whether the African Union is ready to represent the continent effectively and raise its concerns

during the Summit. To reap the benefits of its participation, the AU will need to set up efficient

institutions and procedures. The Union members also need to agree on their representation at

the G20 Finance Track and Sherpa Track, as well as at the finance ministers’ meeting. Here,

the AU can draw lessons from the EU and utilise the services of the African Development

Bank, the UN Economic Commission for Africa, and policy research institutions across the

continent. The Union must also undertake serious structural and financial reforms to encourage

domestic resource mobilisation and avoid reliance on external funding. Most importantly,

Africa must speak in one cohesive voice. This article aims to evaluate AU’s strategic

opportunities, challenges, and progress to date vis-à-vis its G20 participation.

Keywords: Africa Club, African Union, AfCFTA, Agenda 2063, G20, Global South,

Multipolarity

Español

África se encuentra en una encrucijada histórica, preparada para influir en los debates y las

políticas internacionales tras su incorporación al G20 como miembro permanente en 2024.

Ante la oportunidad de expresar su opinión sobre cuestiones globales cruciales, la expectativa

en África es, naturalmente, alta. Sin embargo, existen dudas sobre si la Unión Africana está

preparada para representar al continente de manera efectiva y plantear sus inquietudes durante

la Cumbre. Para aprovechar los beneficios de su participación, la UA deberá establecer

instituciones y procedimientos eficientes. Los miembros de la Unión también deben acordar su

representación en el Foro Financiero del G20 y el Foro Sherpa, así como en la reunión de

ministros de finanzas. En este contexto, la UA puede aprender de la UE y utilizar los servicios

del Banco Africano de Desarrollo, la Comisión Económica para África de las Naciones Unidas

y las instituciones de investigación de políticas de todo el continente. La Unión también debe

emprender reformas estructurales y financieras profundas para fomentar la movilización de

recursos internos y evitar la dependencia de la financiación externa. Y lo más importante,

África debe hablar con una sola voz cohesionada. Este artículo tiene como objetivo evaluar las

oportunidades estratégicas, los desafíos y los progresos logrados hasta la fecha por la Unión

Africana en relación con su participación en el G20.

Palabras clave: Club de África, Unión Africana, AfCFTA, Agenda 2063, G20, Sur Global,

multipolaridad

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TRABAJO RECIBIDO: 10/2/2026 TRABAJO ACEPTADO: 26/5/2026

Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

Background

The 20th G20 Summit, held in November 2025 in Johannesburg, South Africa,

represented a landmark moment for Africa, marking the first time the African Union (AU)

participated as a permanent member in a summit hosted on the continent. During the 18th G20

Summit in 2023, AU was integrated into the G20 high table under the Presidency of India

(Shankar 2024). Given that Africa contributes only 4 per cent of global GDP, AU’s permanent

membership in the group defies the bloc’s guiding principle (Triggs 2021). It is rather an

acknowledgement of Africa’s growing saliency in this increasingly multipolar world (Anna

2023). Prior to the AU, South Africa was the only African nation to have permanent

membership.

Up to 2023, the G20 forum consisted of 19 member nations and the European Union.

This block represented the most advanced and key economies and was the largest regional

economic organisation. As the forum accounted for over 85 per cent of the world’s GDP and

75 per cent of global trade, it played a decisive role in shaping the international economic and

political framework (Munyati 2023). With the African Union joining this elite bloc, the body

has effectively become G21.

By 2026, the African Union’s inclusion in the G20 has moved beyond a symbolic

milestone to an evolving test of its institutional and diplomatic capacity. Following its

participation in the 2024 Brazil and 2025 South Africa Summits, the AU has begun to establish

a more consistent presence across key G20 processes, including the Sherpa and Finance Tracks.

While these engagements have enhanced Africa’s visibility in global economic governance,

they have also exposed persistent structural and coordination challenges within the Union. As

a result, the focus has gradually shifted from the significance of membership itself to the

effectiveness of participation, particularly in terms of agenda-setting influence, policy

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coherence, and the ability to articulate a unified continental position in an increasingly complex

and multipolar global landscape.

As Africa has a chance to voice its opinion on critical global issues that directly affect

the continent, such as climate change, energy, and the reform of multilateral bodies, the

platform offers an important opportunity. Yet, the question of whether the AU is prepared to

represent the continent and raise its concerns during the Summit is being raised (Bhattacharya

2023). It goes without saying that the AU’s mere participation alone in the G21 will not be

sufficient to take advantage of the prospects it has for Africa. In order to capitalise on its

permanent seat at the G20 and make its voice heard, the AU must act as a single unit,

representing the interests of the whole continent, and set up efficient institutions and procedures

at the earliest.

Emergence of G20 as a multilateral institution

Before the inclusion of African Union (AU), the Group of Twenty (G20) comprised

nineteen countries—Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India,

Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa,

Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and the United States—along with the European Union. As the

principal forum for international economic cooperation, the G20 remained critical in shaping

and strengthening global economic governance and institutional architecture. Currently, G20

members account for approximately 85 per cent of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP), over

75 per cent of international trade, and around two-thirds of the global population (Hajnal,

2019).

Established in 1999 after the Asian financial crisis, the G20 was initially conceived as a

platform for dialogue among Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (Kirton, 2016).

Its initial mandate was to promote international financial stability by enabling policy

coordination on global economic issues. However, the 2007–2008 global financial crisis

necessitated elevating the forum to the level of Heads of State and Government. This transition,

formalised in 2009, marked the G20’s recognition as the “premier forum for international

economic cooperation” (Nelson, 2009).

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Unlike other international institutions, the G20 does not operate through a permanent

secretariat or administrative apparatus. Instead, it functions through annual summits hosted by

a rotating presidency. While the forum’s early focus remained on macroeconomic coordination

and financial regulation, its agenda has since expanded considerably to encompass several

global issues, including trade, sustainable development, global health, agriculture, energy

security, climate change, environmental sustainability, and anti-corruption measures.

The transformation of the G20 from a narrowly focused finance-centred forum to a

broader policy platform was solidified through different key declarations over the years,

reaffirming the forum’s expanded role and long-term vision. From that perspective, the

evolution of its agenda also underscores the broader shift of the organisational objective, from

crisis management toward the promotion of strong, sustainable, and balanced global growth.

Although not a member of the group since 2023, Africa’s engagement with the G20 has

gained prominence, particularly in the context of global sustainable development frameworks.

The continent has demonstrated significant commitment to the United Nations 2030 Agenda

for Sustainable Development while advancing its strategic vision through the African Union’s

Agenda 2063. These frameworks reflect Africa’s long-term development objectives and pursuit

of economic integration, infrastructure development, and inclusive growth.

At the G20 Hangzhou Summit 2016, member states reaffirmed their commitment to

aligning their policies with the 2030 Agenda and enhancing coherence across national and

international development strategies (Scholz & Brandi, 2017). Given the interconnectedness of

global challenges such as climate change, economic volatility, and public health crises, it

became evident that policy decisions made by G20 members have direct and profound

implications for Africa’s development trajectory, and vice versa. This interdependence

highlighted the importance of integrating African perspectives within all G20 decision-making

processes, rather than relying on fragmented or ad hoc initiatives.

A significant development in integrating Africa’s needs in the G20 format was the launch

of the Compact with Africa in 2017, under Germany’s G20 Presidency. The initiative sought to

improve the investment climate and foster private sector-led growth in African partner

countries, marking a departure from traditional aid-based models. It aimed to stimulate job

creation by attracting private capital and strengthening local entrepreneurship. However, the

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effectiveness of this initiative remained constrained by the absence of a formalised mechanism

for sustained dialogue between the G20 and the African Union. As the sole African member of

the G20 until recently, South Africa could not adequately represent the continent’s diverse

interests.

India’s long-standing engagement with Africa, articulated during the 2008 India–Africa

Forum Summit (IAFS) and reflected in the Delhi Declaration, emphasised collaboration with

the African Union and Regional Economic Communities (RECs). While India’s support has

primarily taken the form of capacity-building and private investment, a significant

breakthrough occurred during its G20 Presidency in 2023. At the 18th G20 Summit held in

New Delhi, India successfully advocated for the formal inclusion of the African Union as a

permanent member of the G20. This milestone ensures Africa’s institutional representation at

the highest level of global economic governance and marks a significant step toward greater

inclusivity in international policymaking.

Importance of G20 for Africa

Since gaining their independence, African nations have embraced regional integration as

a means to overcome the economic limitations of fragmented, small economies. Various pan-

African organisations have emerged to deepen economic, social, and political cooperation

across the continent. In fact, many colonial-era cross-border arrangements have continued post-

independence and have supported regional integration.

For instance, the West African CFA

franc, used by countries in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), has

been integrated into the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Furthermore, on May 25, 1963, the Conference of Independent African States convened,

leading to the formation of the pan-African body, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU),

with 30 of the 32 independent African countries in attendance.

Africa has a population of 1.3 billion, comparable to China and India. As of 2023, it is

the eighth-largest economy in the world, with a projected GDP of $3.1 trillion. The IMF

projects a GDP growth rate of 3.8 per cent for 2024, exceeding the global average, indicating

significant economic growth on the continent (IMF 2024). Africa will undoubtedly contribute

significantly to global growth in the years to come, highlighting the continent’s vital role in the

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prosperity of other G21 members. Furthermore, Africa is well-positioned to become the world’s

second industrial hub after China, thanks to its strong demographics and renewable energy

potential. It is impossible to overlook Africa’s economic potential since it is essential to

everyone’s success.

By having a seat at the G20 table, Africa has earned a unique opportunity to bring

attention to its concerns and persuade international leaders to make decisions that would benefit

the continent. However, for many African leaders, the visibility and glamour of representation

at the forum outweigh their desire to influence. Nevertheless, visibility ought to serve as a tool

rather than an objective. African influence can be increased by bringing the global south’s

perspectives on addressing obstacles related to exclusionary growth, debt vulnerabilities,

climate change, and more equitable multilateral entities to the G20 (Owino & Kagume, 2024).

Undoubtedly, with the African Union’s permanent membership in the G20, Africa has

now become an active participant in the deliberations shaping its economic future rather than

merely a passive recipient. This would surely have massive consequences, especially as the

policymaking process that directly impacts Africa’s social and economic interests would be

prioritised. However, taking advantage of these opportunities would depend on AU’s active

involvement and use of its influence to shape the group’s agenda-setting and policy-negotiation

processes (G20 Brazil 2024).

Institutional challenges for the AU

Without creating institutional arrangements and processes that are technically sound,

operationally agile, and politically legitimate, the African Union cannot benefit from its

participation and influence. The African Union has 55 members, although seven were

suspended between June 2019 and August 2023 (PSC Report 2023). In December 2023, the

AU Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) established a subcommittee to work on the

modalities of participation. It was charged to explore ways to structure the AU’s participation

in the G21.

The G20 Summit is preceded by multiple meetings with ministers, central bank

governors, and technical working groups for the G20 Finance Track and Sherpa Track, where

the AU needs to be well represented. This renders the AU Commission’s role crucial: to

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participate in these critical technical working groups and to contribute to the creation of shared

positions. In this regard, it is important to fill the position of technical focal point in the AU

Commission with an appropriately staffed and capacitated AU Department of Economic

Development, Trade, Tourism Industry, and Minerals. The African Union can also design it in

line with the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), as its member states already use

APRM to monitor and evaluate their governance performance (Chourasia 2023). In addition to

the AU, it is imperative to efficiently utilise the functions of the African Development Bank,

the UN Economic Community for Africa, and policy research institutions from across the

continent.

There are plenty of policy recommendation studies for AU to draw inspiration from the

EU. Indeed, the AU can draw some lessons from the EU for its role and responsibilities.

However, this inspiration will be limited, as these two unions and their structures are strikingly

different. And, most importantly, unlike the EU, the AU lacks the delegated authority to act on

behalf of its member states (Akinola, 2023).

During the 37th AU Summit in January 2024, it was decided that the AU delegation

during the next G20 Summit would be led by Mauritania’s President, Mohamed Ould

Ghazouani, the rotating chair of the AU Assembly (Laplace 2024). And the responsibilities of

the AU Commission’s Chair, Moussa Faki Mahamat, will be limited to supporting the AU

Assembly’s Chair. This prioritisation of the AU Assembly over the AU Commission indicates

the AU members’ long-standing reluctance to grant the AU Commission adequate authority.

Despite the secretariat being replaced by a commission, the Assembly’s power remains

greater than that of the Commission Head, creating an impediment to the Commission’s ability

to represent Africa with authority (Djilo & Handy 2024). It also highlights the need to strike a

balance between institutional and technical competencies, which are essential to the

effectiveness of AU membership and political legitimacy.

Further, as the Sherpas, assisted by the sous-Sherpas, carry out most of the work during

G20 meetings, this makes the Sherpa track one of the G20’s primary operational modes. A

Sherpa is typically a person who leads a team of experts responsible for conducting research

and articulating African perspectives on issues at the global and continental levels. Therefore,

having a Sherpa attached to the AU chairman’s office would be a prerequisite. Yet because

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AU’s selection procedure is not yet clearly defined, choosing the Sherpa team proved another

formidable obstacle. During the January Summit of the AU, it was decided that the Sherpa

from the AU Chair country and the Sous-Sherpa from the AU Commission would head the AU.

While this decision temporarily douses the debate, it confirms doubts about the AU’s capacity

to forge an agreement, given its members’ inadequate resources, shoddy procedures, and lack

of political will.

The finance track is another essential arm of the G20. By protocol, the governors of

central banks and finance ministers oversee the G20 Finance Track. However, unlike the EU,

which has a European Central Bank, there is no African Central Bank. Therefore, it will be

necessary for the AU to leverage the expertise of Specialised and Technical Committees whose

mandates are pertinent to the G20 sectoral ministerial meetings. Finally, foreign Ministers are

another important bloc that meets in parallel to the G20 Summit. Yet, , the right candidate to

represent AU in these talks still remains unclear, and AU may be forced to come up with

piecemeal, temporary solution again.

Given that neither the AU Chairperson nor the AU Commission has delegated sovereign

authority, the AU’s ability to effectively represent itself in the G20 would indeed depend on the

support and buy-in of the larger AU membership. Therefore, the Permanent Representatives

Committee’s function and those of any pertinent subcommittees would play an extremely

decisive role. At this stage, the task of anchoring the G20 file at the PRC level can be delegated

to the relevant subcommittee, such as the Subcommittee for Economic and Trade Issues.

Furthermore, developing a shared perspective beyond this framework of participatory

consultation requires a deeper and more harmonised set of African states’ trade, financial, and

economic policies. Therefore, it is imperative that the operationalisation of pertinent AU

bodies, such as financial institutions, be accelerated. This would make AU’s participation more

effective and also help in policy harmonisation.

Financial and Logistical Hurdles

Considering the intensity of the focused discussion on the African agenda during the

Summit is directly proportional to the financial contribution from the AU and, thus, to the

economy and budget allocations for the AU from the African member states, the independent

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source of financing would be fundamental. It is even more necessary given the current global

geopolitical landscape. Consequently, any external financing should be avoided, and funds

from the AU budget, as well as funds raised from within the continent and from pan-African

institutions, should be used to finance the AU’s participation in the G21.

So far, most member states have agreed to fund the AU’s participation through grants

from African financial institutions, such as the African Export-Import Bank and the African

Development Bank, as well as through the AU’s regular budget. However, how much of it

occurs on the ground is a concern. The AU may be forced to consider various funds from

development partners as an alternative source of funding.

Towards this goal, a new alliance was formed on the sidelines of the AU summit known

as the “Africa Club”. The coalition brings together five Multilateral Financial Institutions

owned and controlled by Africans. These five organisations are the African Export-Import

Bank (AfreximBank), the Trade and Development Bank (TDB), the Africa Finance

Corporation (AFC), the African Reinsurance Corporation (Africa Re), and the African Trade

and Investment Development Insurance (ATIDI). These financial institutions have stepped up

to support African states throughout the recent financial crisis.

The Need for a Cohesive African Voice

On May 25, 1963, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the predecessor organisation

of the AU, was established in Ethiopia to reflect African realities of colonial subjugation and

counter any form of foreign oppression (Falola, 2022). In many ways, the organisation has

been successful, particularly in providing a platform for discussing and debating African

challenges. Yet, the challenges towards bringing one cohesive African voice persist.

A prime example of this difference is that, despite multiple rounds of discussions in

various settings on the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, the African House remains divided. This

was palpable during the 2022 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting, when only

27 member states supported the resolution condemning Russia’s actions and demanding its

withdrawal from Ukraine (Bhattacharya 2024). The remaining members either abstained or

chose not to participate in the vote.

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The fact that the AU recognises Western Sahara as a member state despite the non-

recognition of two-thirds of its members is another example of the AU’s internal divisions. Yet

again, the debate over Israel’s observer status in the African Union had to be postponed during

the 2022 annual summit of the AU in order to prevent an irreversible rift among its members.

African leaders often prioritise domestic concerns or align with external powers over

fostering continental unity. The ongoing rivalry for regional leadership among African powers

such as South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, and Ethiopia further underscores the deepening divisions

within the African Union (AU). The AU’s inability to mediate conflicts effectively, such as the

Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) dispute among Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt,

highlights its struggle to reconcile divergent national interests. Similarly, in the Sahel, regional

fragmentation within ECOWAS has led to tensions between the Alliance of Sahel States,

comprising Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali, and a pro-Western bloc of coastal West African

nations, led by Nigeria.

The AU’s lack of leverage to influence its member states’ behaviour, whether through

sanctions or positive incentives, undermines its capacity to promote cohesion. As long as these

structural challenges remain unresolved, the AU’s vision of speaking with one unified African

voice will remain elusive.

Undoubtedly, as the newest G20 member, the AU would be required to take rapid and

decisive actions on matters regarding and beyond Africa. However, due in part to the vast

differences in priorities among its member states, the African Union’s decision-making process

has frequently been slow and has been impeded by a lack of consensus on important issues. To

effectively draw the attention of global players to African matters, AU members must present

a united front on international issues. The continent faces formidable challenges from extreme

poverty, political instability, and threats to peace and security, all of which call for coordinated

global action. The AU must cooperate and act as a group to meet Africa’s specific requirements.

This cannot occur unless member states communicate uniformly.

According to some scholars, this marks the emergence of African realpolitik, in which

each African country decides based on its national interests (Bhattacharya 2023). However, the

fact remains that it is still challenging to find a common African perspective. The most unusual

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doubt regarding the AU’s claim to represent this large continent is its inability to establish

assertive leadership over all its member states.

Challenges and Strategic Opportunities

For AU to promote the African cause, it first needs to work as a single entity representing

diverse social, economic, and political units. The AU states that its vision is a united, thriving,

and peaceful Africa, led by its own people and emerging as a powerful force on the global stage

(African Union Agenda 2063).

The AU needs to identify shared challenges that can unite the continent, including

strengthening Resilience in Nutrition and Food Security, energy security, and sustainable

livelihood opportunities. The internal cohesion of African governments and stakeholders

toward global economic and financial governance may be enhanced by the AU’s G20

membership. Accelerating Agenda 2063 through the promotion of international financial

institution reform, increased agricultural output, a just energy transition, and enhanced trade

and investment under the framework of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)

should remain among the African Union’s priority areas.

Further, the AU must establish efficient institutions and procedures if it aspires to reap

the benefits of its G20 membership. Engagement and impact in the G20 are contingent upon

these frameworks and guidelines. Additionally, the AU must specify the capacity needs for its

participation in the G20 nations as well as for the AU Commission, member states, and other

entities.

Evaluating the African Union’s performance so far

AU’s initial performance as a permanent G20 member across the 2024 Brazil and 2025

South Africa Summits presents a mixed but instructive picture. In Brazil, the AU succeeded in

symbolically asserting Africa’s presence within global economic governance, particularly by

foregrounding issues such as climate finance, debt restructuring, and development equity.

However, its substantive influence remained limited, largely due to coordination challenges

and the absence of clearly articulated common positions across member states. By the 2025

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South Africa Summit, there was a noticeable improvement in agenda alignment, with stronger

emphasis on Global South priorities and greater visibility of African-led narratives. South

Africa’s dual role as both a G20 member and continental representative helped streamline

messaging, yet this also raised concerns about whether broader African interests were fully

reflected or disproportionately shaped by a few leading states.

Despite these incremental gains, many of the institutional gaps identified prior to AU’s

inclusion have only been partially addressed. Progress has been made in clarifying

representation mechanisms, particularly within the Sherpa and Finance Tracks. Still, these

remain ad hoc and heavily dependent on the capacity of the presiding AU Chair’s country. The

lack of a permanent technical secretariat or dedicated coordination unit within the AU

Commission continues to constrain continuity, policy coherence, and sustained engagement

across G20 cycles. Financial independence also remains unresolved, with reliance on external

and partner funding still evident. Most critically, the challenge of forging a unified African

negotiating position persists, limiting the AU’s ability to leverage its collective bargaining

power fully. While the AU has transitioned from observer to participant, its evolution into an

effective agenda-shaper within the G20 framework is still a work in progress.

As the last two summits took place in Global South countries, South-South cooperation

was naturally at the centre of the agendas on both occasions. However, as the Summit shifts to

the United States, especially when the government of US is not particularly fond of

multilateralism, the AU needs better preparation and action plan for effective participation,

such as developing a framework for the selection of Sherpas, Sous-Sherpas, and other

positions, holding pre-summit internal discussions and negotiations, and ensuring the

sustainability of the momentum.

The Road Ahead

Africa is at a historic crossroads, poised to influence international discussions and

policies, having joined the G20 for the first time as a permanent member in 2024. AU has now

completed two full cycles of participation as a permanent member of the G20. Since its formal

inclusion in 2023, the African Union (AU) has transitioned from symbolic representation to a

more active policy participant. The experiences of the 2024 Brazil and 2025 South Africa

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Summits have demonstrated both the potential and the limitations of Africa’s role within the

forum. While the AU has consistently placed issues such as climate finance, debt vulnerability,

and equitable development on the G20 agenda, its ability to shape final outcomes has been

constrained by internal coordination challenges and institutional limitations.

The AU’s participation has also underscored the importance of sustained institutional

reform. Although some progress has been made in streamlining representation, particularly

through clearer roles in the Sherpa and Finance Tracks, these mechanisms continue to rely

heavily on the capacities of individual member states rather than a centralised and permanent

AU structure. The absence of a dedicated technical secretariat within the AU Commission has

limited continuity across G20 cycles, weakening Africa’s ability to maintain negotiating

momentum and policy coherence. At the same time, financial dependence on external partners

has persisted, raising concerns about the long-term sustainability and autonomy of the AU’s

engagement.

Looking ahead to 2026, AU’s participation could create a strategic opportunity for the

continent to drive meaningful global change in favour of the Global South. “Solidarity,

Equality, Sustainability” was the theme of South Africa’s G20 chairmanship in 2025, with a

particular emphasis on the Global South. Africa, as the host, successfully conveyed its message

on ways to achieve the continent’s development objectives. However, as the G20 returns to the

United States, it becomes more important for Africa to raise the voice of the Global South.

The changing geopolitical environment has made it even more critical for the AU to

consolidate its internal processes and present unified positions. Encouragingly, there are signs

of greater pre-summit coordination among member states and increased involvement of African

financial and policy institutions. However, deep-seated divisions among member states

continue to limit the AU’s ability to act decisively and speak with one voice on contentious

global issues.

Towards that goal, the AU must centre its advocacy around Africa’s global

interconnectedness. The AU should be accorded adequate recognition by economies in the

global south, given the continent’s significance to development. Without influencing G20

decisions, the AU won’t be able to break the global north’s hegemony in financial and economic

governance. However, to do that, African governments also need to give the AU greater

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authority to represent the continent at the G20 table. To reach an agreement on several African-

related topics, dedicated negotiations are required. An empowered AU Commission is the only

body capable of defending Africa’s interests.

In the contemporary multipolar world, the G20 needs Africa as much as Africa needs the

G20. With Africa fully involved, the G20 can reimagine itself and avoid the danger of its

relevance waning, especially amid the growing importance of the BRICS. The AU’s

membership would have a significant strategic impact on global governance, not only in terms

of Africa’s representation but also in its ability to help transform the G20 into a vehicle for

utilising multilateral organisations like the UN to create a more equitable, prosperous, and

sustainable global community.

Ultimately, the AU’s long-term effectiveness within the G20 will depend on its ability to

evolve from a coalition of states into a more cohesive and empowered institutional actor. This

will require not only technical and financial strengthening but also stronger political will among

member states to delegate authority and prioritise collective continental interests over narrow

national agendas. If these challenges are addressed, Africa’s presence in the G20 could move

beyond representation toward genuine influence, contributing meaningfully to a more inclusive

and balanced system of global economic governance.

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Author Contributions (CRediT)

1 — Project administration; 2 — Funding acquisition; 3 — Formal analysis; 4 —

Conceptualization; 5 — Data curation; 6 — Writing – review and editing; 7 —

Investigation; 8 — Methodology; 9 — Resources; 10 — Writing – original draft; 11 —

Software; 12 — Supervision; 13 — Validation; 14 — Visualization.

Authors' Full Names

Academic Contribution

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Samir Bhattacharya

x x x x x x